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In our world there is a continuous drive to be better, faster, stronger, 
prettier or more intelligent. We want to live longer, fight disease more 
effectively, and prevent disease wherever possible. Improved quality 
of life is a universal human endeavour.
The concept of biomedical enhancement may be defined as 
follows: ‘a deliberate intervention, applying biomedical science, 
which aims to improve an existing capacity that most or all normal 
human beings typically have, or to create a new capacity, by acting 
directly on the body or brain’.1
Enhancement therapies are easily justified in those suffering 
from disabilities, but their use in healthy subjects, with the aim of 
improving ‘normal’ functioning, raises ethical issues. 
There have been reports over the past few decades about uses 
for stimulants, such as methylphenidate, for which they are not 
traditionally indicated and for which these drugs are not registered. 
South African lay press reports claim that the use of methylphenidate, 
especially by healthy students with no previous or current diagnosis 
of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), has increased 
dramatically. The reason for this phenomenon is that it is claimed 
that methylphenidate increases concentration and improves academic 
prowess, with unsubstantiated reports of increases in academic 
performance of up to 36%.2
Doctors are required to adhere to the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa (HPCSA) guidelines, according to which 
methylphenidate is a highly scheduled drug to be prescribed and 
dispensed only under strictly controlled conditions. On the other 
hand, there is pressure from the community to prescribe enhancement 
therapies in cases where there is no specific diagnosis present.  
The following arguments reflect the concerns noted by various 
role-players: 
• Using cognitive enhancement is a form of cheating, and it allows 
users an unfair advantage. 
• It is dishonest and detracts from the user as role-model for others.
• The problem of indirect coercion – the belief that everybody else 
is taking these drugs and that I will be left behind if I do not.
• The argument that stimulants are dangerous – both because of 
direct physiological side-effects and the possibility that they are 
habit forming. 
• If enhancement is not regulated or even banned outright, it will 
inevitably result in an eventual unknown future ‘post-human’ 
being, an unnatural entity with the expected potential to harm, 
abuse or suppress those who have not been exposed to the 
enhancement therapies.3,4
Background
Cognitive-enhancing drugs, or nootropics, have been around for a 
long time. Various cultures have used certain indigenous herbs to 
promote memory and concentration for thousands of years. 
In conventional psychopharmacology, nootropics include 
psychostimulants such as methylphenidate, modafinil, amphetamines 
and medicinal caffeine. Other classes of non-stimulant nootropics 
include drugs used to treat dementia, such as donepezil, rivastigmine 
and galantamine. Despite evidence that methylphenidate improves 
domains of cognitive functioning, there is also evidence that in 
subjects with a high memory span and familiarity of tasks, functioning 
may actually deteriorate.5,6 The mere fact that there is some evidence 
of benefit would be sufficient reason to expect that the demand for 
methylphenidate for cognitive enhancement will continue.  
Safety concerns
Methylphenidate is only registered for specific indications such as 
ADHD and narcolepsy, which implies that prescribing it to improve 
concentration in healthy students is done ‘off-label’. Although ‘off-
label’ use is controversial in the medical fraternity, it is not illegal, and 
is often done in clinical practice. 
The risk-benefit ratio must always be considered. Although this 
applies to all drugs, it is more relevant in ‘off-label’ prescriptions. It 
would not be considered justifiable to prescribe a dangerous drug 
to healthy subjects merely to increase their cognitive performance, 
especially if the evidence of efficacy is not conclusive.
Although methylphenidate is generally considered a safe 
and widely used drug, potential users must be made aware that 
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cardiac complications have been reported in some high-risk 
groups. 
The question of addiction
An emotive response often associated with the use of methylphenidate 
is the fear of addiction. Methylphenidate is chemically similar to 
cocaine and may have similar potential for abuse or addiction. In 
countries such as Sweden it was banned during the 1960s, but current 
evidence demonstrates that if it is used at prescribed doses, the risk 
of abuse is very low. 
Why enhancements may be needed
Many physicians may respond with a ‘gut feeling’ that enhancement 
is wrong, but there are also clear reasons why it may be beneficial, 
for example:1,7
• The human propensity for violence and conflict may be lessened 
by enhancing capacities for impulse control, sympathy, altruism 
or moral imagination, through pharmaceutical or genetic 
interventions.  
• Enhancement of the human capacity to extract nutrients from 
current foods, or even from substrates that we have been unable 
to use as food sources previously, may alleviate food shortages.  
• Enhancement of the ‘normal’ viability of human gametes and/or 
embryos may be needed in an increasingly toxic environment 
to counteract a decrease in fertility and reduce the risk of lethal 
mutations.
• Enhancements may help us adapt physiologically to climate 
change and its associated dangers.
• Enhancement of the immune system to accelerate the 
development of resistance to virulent emerging infectious 
diseases.  
• Cognitive enhancement may enable students in an age of 
information overload to cope with daily demands and their 
competitive academic environment. 
• A speculative reason for cognitive enhancement could include 
the likelihood that it assists us to be more virtuous, as virtuous 
behaviour depends on sound judgements, and sound judgements 
depend on good ability to reason and process information.1
Questions about cognitive 
enhancement
Is enhancement cheating? 
In most sports, performance-enhancing drugs are banned, as it is 
believed that those who use them have an unfair advantage. Sport 
guidelines are clear and ‘punishment’ for disobeying the rules is often 
severe – resulting in prolonged and/or permanent banishment from 
competition. 
Nevertheless, enhancement by technological means is not seen as 
morally problematic, as long as it falls within the rules. This raises the 
issue as to whether the act of cheating is determined by the rule and 
not the morality of the act in itself.  
What would the good doctor do? 
The good doctor may experience a dilemma in deciding what the 
right course of action would be regarding cognitive enhancement. 
What good doctor would stand in the way of a student fulfilling 
his or her potential with all the resulting benefits? On the other 
hand, might this student be at risk of becoming addicted to 
methylphenidate? 
The physician has an obligation to prevent, cure or reduce 
suffering – but there is no established duty to make patients ‘better 
than well’.8 It may therefore also be argued that the virtuous doctor’s 
responsibility ends with the rational and ethical treatment of disease 
or an established disorder. Nevertheless, although enhancement may 
fall outside the doctor’s scope of practice, he or she has been awarded 
the custodianship thereof. 
Even if enhancement is not considered a ‘proper’ medical 
outcome, is enhancement itself morally permissible or not? This 
speaks directly to the ambivalence experienced by many medical 
practitioners in the debate around the use of methylphenidate in 
healthy students. 
Who should decide? 
The paternalistic doctor role is no longer seen as the only model of 
interaction between patient and doctor. Informative and deliberative 
styles of interaction are now considered more appropriate. Doctors 
may claim that their decisions on whether or not to prescribe 
cognitive enhancement are purely based on safety concerns and a 
lack of proven efficacy. But in truth, decisions are also based on the 
doctor’s own opinion regarding the ethics of enhancement. This 
would be considered a paternalistic action on behalf of the doctor 
and the justification of enhancement should actually not fall under 
the jurisdiction of medicine per se.
What about justice? 
Access to methylphenidate would be unequal in South Africa. 
Availability of a doctor, financial means and knowledge about 
enhancement are not equally available. Various technologies and 
interventions are widely used to promote academic achievement, 
however, from the simple use of artificial light to computers and the 
Internet. It would be unthinkable to ban these technologies because 
inequalities in availability prevent some from access. 
Should we worry about the slippery slope? 
The slippery slope argument states that if an individual or society 
embarks on a certain course of action, it is likely to result in a chain of 
consequences. The end of this chain is highly immoral or undesirable 
and implies the development of a so-called post-human state. The 
only way to prevent the end result is not to start the process at all.9,10 
But the slippery slope argument may also be considered a continuum 
fallacy, which states that there is a mistake in logic in that the eventual 
outcome is not a given. 
Responsible development of enhancement technologies would be 
expected to have various checks and balances built into the process. 
There is also no clear reason why a cognitively enhanced being would 
be less moral or ethical.
Is enhancement against nature? 
The ‘argument from nature’ is commonly used in contemporary 
debate on moral issues in bioethics. This is a conservative stance, 
condemning anything that is perceived as being against what is seen 
as ‘natural’. But man has been modifying nature for thousands of 
years in the process of enhancing quality of life and to ensure safety. 
Nature has given us illnesses like malaria, cancer and AIDS, and to 
claim that we have no moral right to fight these illnesses because they 
are determined by nature is clearly irrational.
Should doctors restrict themselves to therapy? 
Therapy – an intervention aimed at the treatment of disease – 
would generally not be considered to be an unethical practice, 
whereas enhancement is clearly frowned upon in various quarters.1 
A consistent distinction between therapy and enhancement is 
difficult to uphold10-12 when considering that an intervention such 
as vaccination is not aimed at treating a disorder or disease. As it 
FORUM
911  December 2012, Vol. 102, No. 12  SAMJ
is in fact aimed at enhancing the immune system, this argument 
becomes less clear.  
Is erosion of character not inevitable? 
The expressivist character concern states that the pursuit of 
enhancement, independently of the eventual outcomes and 
consequences, is a sign of an already existing ‘bad’ character. 
The consequentialist concerns predict that the active pursuit of 
enhancement leads to the progressive development of bad character. 
Many ‘bad’ decisions and actions will eventually contribute to the 
failure of character integrity.1  
Bioconservatives argue that there is something intrinsically 
valuable about human nature, and if we enhance ourselves, this will 
be lost. However, it is highly problematic to think of ‘human nature’ 
as a moral concept or a moral desideratum. If ‘human nature’ is, 
morally speaking, something to preserve at all costs, we must accept 
that we ought also to preserve all the characteristics which are part of 
‘human nature’, such as jealousy, vindictiveness and cruelty, that are 
generally regarded as (also morally) undesirable.
Sandel claims that the pursuit of enhancement betrays and 
exacerbates existing character deficits because it demonstrates a lack 
of appreciation for ‘giftedness’ – a sense of accepting the limitations 
of human powers and what we cannot control.13 Those lacking 
an appreciation for ‘giftedness’ and who promote the processes of 
enhancement do so because of a desire for mastery and perfection. 
This relates to a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, purely to 
serve our own purposes and satisfy our desires.  
It is not clear how the jump from a desire to be better or live 
longer to the desire to master others or the desire for immortality can 
be made. Sandel’s argument is furthermore inconsistent in that he 
accepts that we ought to fight disease, whereas disease is undoubtedly 
part of the ‘giftedness of life’. Sandel’s alleged distinction between 
those aspects of life that we ought to ‘accept’ in children, and those we 
wish to ‘transform’ (also through education), is quite unclear.
If we consider humans today to be more advanced than our 
predecessors of a few centuries ago, whether because of use of new 
technologies, better nutrition or whatever, are we less moral today 
than in 1800? Interactions between humans remain fraught with old 
and new immoralities, but there are also many examples of altruism 
and enhanced moral arguments put forward by the very societies that 
promote enhancement.   
Conclusion
Whether the use of methylphenidate by healthy students should 
be allowed or not is not straightforward. However, the demands 
by users and ongoing developments in cognitive enhancement are 
rapidly leading us to the point where not to decide is in fact to 
decide.8 Further developments in cognitive enhancement may well 
be safer than methylphenidate, but this does not imply that the use 
of cognitive enhancement techniques should be put on hold until 
then. Nevertheless, some doctors either remain unconvinced by the 
arguments for the promotion of cognitive enhancement in healthy 
subjects or refuse to debate the issue.
This anti-enhancement point of view may be derived from a 
combination of ‘fear of doing wrong’ and traditional paternalism. 
But the demand for enhancement requires debate broader than 
that of traditional medicine, and medical practitioners should 
be seen as participants in this debate rather than all-powerful 
gatekeepers.
Finally, we would argue that, before the prescription of 
performance-enhancing drugs is considered as standard practice, 
more decisive clinical trials about their efficacy and safety for this 
purpose are required.
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Proud Watsonia
Radiant in the morning rain
Nourished by the stream.
Haiku: Peter Folb
